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INTRODUCTION 
In the recent and relatively unnoticed Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc.,1 the Supreme Court altered a long-established2 standard of 
commercial speech3 jurisprudence. For more than three decades 
leading up to Sorrell, First Amendment4 challenges to state regula-
tion of commercial speech were subject to “intermediate-tier” 
judicial scrutiny.5 The intermediate-tier standard acknowledged 
that forms of speech proposing a commercial transaction deserved 
at least some protection against state regulation, albeit secondary in 
value to core “personal” speech afforded to individuals.6 Partly 
because of its arguably higher “rank” in societal value, core “per-
sonal” speech is protected against governmental regulation on a 
stringent “strict-scrutiny” basis.7 The government needs to justify 
its restriction on personal speech by showing that the restriction 
has a compelling purpose, and that the regulation is narrowly tai-
                                                                                                                            
1 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
2 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need To Break New Ground: A Response To The Supreme 
Court’s Threat To Overhaul The Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 394 
(2012) (“[I]t would be dangerous to depart from well-established precedent applying 
intermediate protection to commercial speech . . . .”). 
3 Famously defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech. . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996); Bd. of Trs. 
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
6 See generally Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 395. (“[A]t the core of the First Amendment 
is the protection of ideas and most often takes the form of political and religious 
speech.”). Professor Pomeranz quotes Justice Breyer: “Because virtually all human 
interaction takes place through speech, the First Amendment cannot offer all speech the 
same degree of protection. Rather, judges must apply different protective presumptions 
in different contexts, scrutinizing government’s speech-related restrictions differently 
depending upon the general category of activity.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur 
cases make clear that the First Amendment offers considerably less protection to the 
maintenance of a free marketplace for goods and services.”). 
7 The Court’s “strict scrutiny” analysis of governmental action is often heralded as 
“strict in theory, fatal in fact.” See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972). 
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lored to achieve that purpose.8 Meanwhile, in order to regulate or 
restrict commercial speech, the government needs only to show 
that the restriction directly advanced a “substantial” purpose, and, 
more importantly, that the regulation was not “more extensive 
than necessary” to serve that purpose. 9 In theory, this disparate 
judicial treatment of core and commercial speech persists even af-
ter Sorrell: while states seeking to restrict various marketing or ad-
vertising techniques need to have a “substantial” reason for doing 
so, it does not need to be “compelling.” 
 In practice, however, some have contended that the combina-
tion of Sorrell’s new “heightened judicial scrutiny” standard, along 
with the increasingly business-friendly10 ideological makeup of the 
Court, has pushed the standard towards a de facto strict scrutiny 
standard.11 Critics believe that this is a mistake—there are substan-
tive and important differences between core and commercial 
speech, and a strict scrutiny standard would blur those differences, 
in effect demeaning the higher-value personal speech in the 
process.12 Others see no reason for a different standard of scrutiny 
at all.13 Yet the confusion surrounding the new Sorrell standard, 
along with Justice Kennedy’s own application of Central Hudson, 
has made lower courts very cautious in abandoning, or even alter-
ing, the established intermediate-tier analysis.14 
                                                                                                                            
8 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (striking down Texas statute 
criminalizing the desecration of the American Flag); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447–48 (1969) (holding that racist political speech by Ku Klux Klan member is protected 
under the First Amendment). 
9 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564–66. 
10 See Adam Liptak, Pro-Business Decisions Are Defining This Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-
decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
11 See, e.g., Samantha Rauer, When The First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The 
Court’s Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations That Restrict 
Commercial Speech, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 690, 691 (2012) (“Despite the conceptualization 
of Central Hudson as an intermediate standard, when examining public health regulations, 
the Court has been increasingly strict in its level of scrutiny.”). 
12 See Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 391–412. 
13 See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 
VA. L. REV. 627 (1990) (arguing that the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech does not warrant divergent levels of constitutional protection). 
14 See infra notes 100–04. 
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This Note argues that until the Court sets forth a clear standard 
of analysis for its “heightened judicial scrutiny” language, tradi-
tional intermediate-tier review will prevail. Although the court may 
have, over the years, established a de facto strict scrutiny standard, 
it has not done so explicitly. Nor have lower courts struck down 
public health regulations merely due to the fact that the regulations 
did not pass “heightened judicial scrutiny”; in fact, after Sorrell, 
the fate of almost every commercial speech restriction evaluated by 
a lower court has come down to whether it passed Central Hudson, 
not the new Sorrell standard.15 This makes sense. If the Sorrell 
Court wanted the constitutional inquiry to end upon a determina-
tion that a regulation was discriminatory based on content or spea-
kership, it probably would have said so. Instead, Justice Kennedy 
opted to take a more familiar path and applied the intermediate-tier 
standard anyway. 
Part I of this Note outlines the modern commercial speech doc-
trine, including the applicability of the Central Hudson standard to 
public health regulation. Part II will discuss the facts and relatively 
novel legal standards introduced in Sorrell, as well as provide an 
analysis of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. It will also discuss 
and analyze Justice Breyer’s intense dissent from Justice Kenne-
dy’s opinion, including his sensitive accusation of the Court wad-
ing into Lochner16-era jurisprudence. It will finally summarize how 
Sorrell has changed, if at all, the evaluation of various public health 
regulations within the lower courts. Part III will gauge the reaction 
to Sorrell, and any impact the majority decision may bring to future 
evaluation of commercial speech regulation. Finally, in Part IV, I 
will conclude by arguing that in the absence of a clear mandate for 
strict scrutiny, lower courts should not treat Sorrell’s new “heigh-
tened judicial scrutiny” standard as dispositive, and opt instead for 
the traditional and familiar intermediate-tier analysis. 
                                                                                                                            
15 Id. 
16 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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I. THE MODERN COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Ever since the Court overruled17 Valentine v. Chrestensen,18 thus 
granting commercial speech First Amendment protection,19 courts 
have had to decide the extent to which governmental regulation 
can restrict such speech in the name of public health. The land-
mark Central Hudson Gas & Electric. Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York20 established a four-pronged, intermediate scruti-
ny standard21 for analyzing the constitutionality of such regula-
tion.22 This framework technically23 remains the standard by which 
the Court evaluates public health regulations that infringe on 
commercial speech rights.24 
Nonetheless, commentators note that the Central Hudson in-
termediate-tier standard itself can be a very tough one for the gov-
ernment to meet.25 In fact, the Court has not upheld a commercial 
                                                                                                                            
17 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
18 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a municipal ban on distributing advertisements in the 
streets, and more broadly holding that commercial speech is not protected under the First 
Amendment). 
19 See Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. 
20 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980) (striking down a New York state regulation banning utility 
companies from advertising their services). 
21 First, the speech cannot be false or misleading, and it must not promote unlawful 
activity. Id. at 563–64. Second, the government must have a “substantial interest” in 
regulation the speech. Id. at 564. Third, the regulation must “directly advance” that 
interest. Id. And finally, the restriction on speech cannot be “more extensive than 
necessary” to serve this interest. Id. 
22 Id. at 557–58, 561. The Court held that the State had a substantial interest in energy 
conservation and making sure that utility rates were “fair and efficient” (prong 2). The 
restriction also “directly advanced” that interest (prong 3). Nonetheless, an outright ban 
on advertising was “more extensive than necessary.” Id. at 571–72. The State, according 
to the Court, could have considered less drastic alternatives, such as adjusting “the 
format and content of . . . advertising,” or forcing the disclosure of “relative efficiency 
and expense” of information. Id. at 571. 
23 Though the Central Hudson framework has survived Sorrell, see infra discussion on 
how Sorrell adds a separate “heightened judicial scrutiny” analysis regarding content and 
speaker neutrality. 
24 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–68 (2011); 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504–06 (1996). 
25 See, e.g., Luke Dawson, A Spoonful of Free Speech Helps The Medicine Go Down: Off-
Label Speech & The First Amendment, 99 IOWA L. REV. 803, 815 (2014) (“[T]oday, Central 
Hudson imposes a heavy burden on the government.”); Rauer, supra note 11 at 691 
(“Despite the conceptualization of Central Hudson as an intermediate standard, when 
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speech restriction in almost two decades.26 The fourth Central 
Hudson requirement, that the regulation cannot be “more exten-
sive than necessary,” can be particularly lethal.27 The Court has 
had little trouble striking down regulations they deemed to be more 
extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s purpose. In 
2002, for instance, the Court struck down a federal ban on the ad-
vertisement of compounded drugs by various pharmacies.28 The 
Court held that although the government had a “substantial inter-
est” in generally promoting public health and safety, and that the 
                                                                                                                            
examining public health regulations, the Court has been increasingly strict in its level of 
scrutiny.”). 
26 Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 391 (citing Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 
(1995) (upholding a state bar rule that imposed a thirty-day ban on targeted direct mail 
solicitations of persons involved in personal injury or wrongful death actions)). 
27 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507 (pl. opinion) (striking down a prohibition on 
advertising the price of alcoholic beverages in part because “alternative forms of 
regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to 
achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 
U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (striking down prohibition on beer labels displaying alcohol 
content in part because of the availability of alternatives “such as directly limiting the 
alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol 
strength . . . or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors”); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (striking down 
a blanket ban on illustrations in advertisements for attorneys); Robert Post, Prescribing 
Records and the First Amendment—New Hampshire’s Data-Mining Statute, 360 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 745, 747 (2009) (“This last requirement is so arbitrary that it constitutes an open 
invitation for judges to bring political prejudices to bear in resolving cases. Antiregulatory 
judges will tend to strike down statutes on the basis of this requirement; proregulatory 
judges will tend to uphold them.”). But see Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (holding that governmental restrictions upon commercial speech 
need not be the absolute least restrictive means to achieve desired end); San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534–35 (1987) (upholding 
Olympic Committee’s right to enforce its trademark in the word ‘Olympics’ against a gay 
rights group’s promotion of the “Gay Olympic Games.”); Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 338-39 (1986) (upholding blanket 
ban on gambling casino advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 
(1978) (upholding regulation of commercial activity deemed harmful to the public even if 
speech is a component of that activity). 
28 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002). Drugs are 
“compounded” when their ingredients are mixed and tailored to the needs of specific 
patients. Id. at 357. They are exempted from having to obtain FDA approval because of 
such particularized need. Id. at 360–61. The regulation was not a “blanket ban” because 
exemption from the FDA approval process was itself conditioned on refraining from 
commercial speech. Providers could still advertise should they choose to go through the 
approval process. Rauer, supra note 11, at 696. 
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ban “directly advanced” that interest, the government still failed 
to show that there weren’t alternative ways to advance its goals 
without infringing on the speech of the pharmacies.29 In fact, Jus-
tice O’Connor went so far as to suggest that if the Court itself could 
identify less restrictive means of achieving the government’s ends, 
the regulation could be found to be too restrictive (emphasis add-
ed).30 
Indeed, the modern Court has developed a relatively consistent 
pattern of striking down public health regulations abridging com-
mercial speech, with much of the Court’s analysis focusing on how 
narrowly tailored the regulations are to the purported interests at 
stake. Blanket bans on advertising, as seen in Central Hudson and 
44 Liquormart,31 deserved “special care”32 because they tended to 
over-inclusively ban entire categories of speech. Yet the Court has 
treated even more narrowly tailored regulations negatively as well. 
In Lorilland Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, for instance, the Court invalidated 
two Massachusetts regulations prohibiting the advertising of 
smokeless tobacco (a) within 1000 feet of a school or playground 
and (b) lower than five feet from the floor of a store located within 
1000 feet of a school or playground.33 A highly splintered Court 
conceded that although these regulations did not amount to a blan-
ket ban, they were more extensive that necessary nonetheless, even 
                                                                                                                            
29 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 (“Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a 
large scale without advertising, the FDAMA’s prohibition on advertising compounded 
drugs might indeed ‘directly advanc[e]’ the Government’s interests.”). Justice 
O’Connor listed a few examples of less restrictive regulations to advance the 
government’s interests in public health and safety: for one, the government could have 
merely banned the use of commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment for 
compounding drugs. Id. at 372. It could have prohibited pharmacists from “[o]ffering 
compounded drug products at wholesale to other state licensed persons or commercial 
entities for resale.” Id. (citation omitted). It could have also “limit[ed] the amount of 
compounded drugs, either by volume or by numbers of prescriptions, that a given 
pharmacist or pharmacy sells out of state.” Id. (citation omitted). 
30 See Dawson, supra note 25, at 815 (citing Thompson, 535 U.S. at 372 (“Another 
possibility not suggested by the Guide would be capping the amount of any particular 
compounded drug, either by drug volume, number of prescriptions, gross revenue, or 
profit that a pharmacist or pharmacy may make or sell in a given period of time.”)). 
31 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500, 505–07 (1996) (striking 
down Rhode Island liquor advertisement ban for not promoting the State’s interest in 
promoting temperance and being more extensive than necessary.). 
32 Id. “Special care” in this case means more stringent scrutiny. 
33 See 533 U.S. 525, 525 (2001). 
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if the State’s interest in discouraging and preventing youth tobacco 
use was compelling.34 The statute invalidated in Thompson also did 
not include a blanket ban, instead only restricting advertising for 
compounding drugs that did not go through FDA approval.35 The 
Court’s hostile treatment of even relatively narrowly tailored pub-
lic health regulation has drawn repeated critiques of the Central 
Hudson standard itself.36 Some allege that the test’s fourth prong 
essentially pushes the standard of review from intermediate to 
strict scrutiny.37 Others, like Justice Thomas, would overturn Cen-
tral Hudson altogether and protect commercial speech at the same 
strict scrutiny standard afforded to personal speech.38 
                                                                                                                            
34 Id. at 542. The Court found that the regulation was more extensive than necessary 
because there was evidence that the Attorney General did not “carefully calculat[e] the 
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed.” Id. at 528 (citing 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)). 
35 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 361-63 (2002). The government 
argued that because compounded drugs were designed to meet unique, individualized 
needs, restrictions on their advertisements served substantial governmental interests in 
public health and safety. Id. at 368. The Court nonetheless concluded that because the 
government did not even consider less restrictive alternatives, the statute abridged speech 
more extensively than necessary. Id. at 373 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it 
means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort. Yet here it seems to have 
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”). 
36 See Rauer, supra note 11, at 693 (citing Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of 
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that the Central Hudson test is 
abstract and unhelpful)); Brian J. Waters, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First 
Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626 (1997) (critiquing the test’s uneven application, which 
results in “confusing jurisprudence”); Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? 
The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (arguing that attacks on 
Central Hudson for the most part urge the Court not to go back to the Cherstensen 
doctrine, but rather to “eliminate commercial speech’s purportedly ‘second-class citizen’ 
status and to offer it full First Amendment protection”). 
37 See Rauer, supra note 11, at 692–93 (“Public health regulations subjected to the 
Central Hudson analysis are almost always invalidated. Although the government has 
attempted to more narrowly tailor its legislative means to substantial interests, the Court 
consistently fails to find that even the more narrowly-tailored regulations can satisfy . . . 
the Central Hudson standard.”). 
38 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that there is no “philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 
‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech”); Kozinski & 
Banner, supra note 13, at 634 (“The first amendment’s text and history don’t provide us 
with any explanation of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.”). 
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II. SORRELL AND THE ROAD TO STRICT SCRUTINY 
 Although Justice Thomas’ concurrence in 44 Liquormart may 
have seemed outlandish at the time, the recent and relatively unno-
ticed Sorrell v. IMS Health may have moved the evaluation of pub-
lic health regulation of commercial speech ever closer to a strict 
scrutiny standard.39 
In Sorrell, the Court considered whether a Vermont law curb-
ing a drug company’s ability to solicit physician prescriptions vi-
olated the company’s First Amendment rights to truthful and law-
ful commercial speech.40 In enacting the Prescription Confidential-
ity Law (known as Act 80), Vermont sought to limit a marketing 
practice by pharmaceutical companies called “detailing.” “Detail-
ing” is when a sales representative for a pharmaceutical company 
(a “detailer”) visits a doctor’s office in order to persuade the doc-
tor to prescribe a particular pharmaceutical.41 Pharmaceutical sales 
agents are much more successful in their marketing efforts if they 
receive “prescriber-identifying information” (PII)42 before visiting 
a doctor’s office. PII is invaluable to pharmaceutical companies be-
cause it allows detailers to quickly target doctors most willing to 
purchase their drug.43 How do pharmaceutical companies get this 
information? In Sorrell, they bought it from pharmacies that were, 
by Vermont law, required to receive and record PII when 
processing prescriptions.44 Most pharmacies then elect to sell the 
PII to “data miners,”45 who in turn produce reports on physicians’ 
prescribing “behavior.”46 Pharmaceutical companies then buy 
these reports in order to refine their marketing tactics and increase 
sales.47 
                                                                                                                            
39 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2659. (“Detailers bring drug samples as well as medical studies that explain the 
‘details’ and potential advantages of various prescription drugs.”). 
42 PII is incredibly valuable because it gives the detailer specific knowledge (“details”) 
of a physician’s prescription patterns. Id. 
43 Id. at 2659–60. 
44 Id. at 2660. 
45 Or: firms that analyze prescriber-identifying information and produce reports on 
prescriber information. 
46 Id. at 2656. 
47 Id. at 2660. 
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The main provision of Vermont’s Act 80, § 4631(d),48 did 
three things: first, it banned pharmacies (among others) from sell-
ing PII, absent the prescriber’s consent. Second, it banned phar-
macies (among others) from allowing PII to be used for “market-
ing,”49 unless the prescriber consented, which in effect barred 
pharmacies from disclosing the information for marketing purposes 
at all.50 Finally, and most importantly, it outlawed pharmaceutical 
companies specifically from using PII for marketing, absent the 
prescriber’s consent.51 These prohibitions were subject to a few 
exemptions. For instance, PII could have been disseminated or 
used for “health care research”; to enforce “compliance” with 
health insurance formularies or preferred drug lists; for “educa-
tional communications” provided to patients for “treatment op-
tions”; for law enforcement operations; and for purposes “other-
wise provided by law.”52 Finally, the Act also created a drug-
education program, designed to “counter-detail,” or persuade doc-
tors to prescribe generic drugs, instead of costlier brand-name 
drugs.53 As such, counter-detailers could use PII, but regular detai-
lers could not.54 
A. Sorrell: Majority Analysis 
The first and perhaps most contentious part of Justice Kenne-
dy’s majority opinion went beyond the typical Central Hudson 
analysis. Indeed, unlike almost any commercial speech case preced-
                                                                                                                            
48 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (West 2010) (“[A] pharmacy . . . shall not sell, 
license, or exchange for value regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable 
information, nor permit the use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable 
information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber 
consents . . . . Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use 
prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless 
the prescriber consents.”). 
49 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. “Marketing” is defined in the Act as including 
“advertising, promotion or any activity” that is “used to influence sales or market share 
of a prescription drug.” Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. (citing § 4631(e) of the Act). 
53 Id. at 2661. 
54 Id. 
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ing Sorrell,55 Justice Kennedy began his analysis by discussing how 
Act 80 on its face implemented speech restrictions based on the 
content of the speech and the identity of the speaker.56 The provi-
sion’s exceptions allowed those in “educational capacities” to pur-
chase and use PII, while prohibiting pharmacies and pharmaceuti-
cal companies from doing the same for marketing purposes. The 
Court held that this was discrimination based on the speaker. 
Moreover, because the Act prohibited the purchase of PII for the 
specific purpose of directly marketing brand name pharmaceuti-
cals, the statute thus “disfavored” speech with a particular con-
tent.57 
Unequivocally and forcefully, Justice Kennedy held that 
“heightened judicial scrutiny” is warranted whenever a “content-
based burden” is imposed on commercial speech.58 As stressed by 
Richard Samp, the adoption of the “heightened” scrutiny standard 
had never been applied in a commercial speech case, although 
Kennedy suggests otherwise.59 Kennedy cites Court precedent60 to 
                                                                                                                            
55 Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech Or Resurrecting Lochner?, 
2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 133 (2011) (“Although the majority suggested that 
‘heightened’ scrutiny had been applied in previous commercial speech cases involving 
content-based speech restrictions, none of the cases cited by the majority were 
commercial speech cases.”). 
56 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663. (“On its face, Vermont’s law enacts content and 
speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying 
information. The provision first forbids the sale subject to exception based in large part of 
the content of a purchaser’s speech. For example, those wish to engage in certain 
‘educational communications’ may purchase the information. The measure then bars any 
disclosure when recipient speakers will use the information for marketing. Finally, the 
provision’s second sentence prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the 
information for marketing. The statute thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a 
particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.”). As Jennifer Pomeranz points out, the respondents’ 
brief urged the Court to adopt Justice Thomas’ strict scrutiny standard for all forms of 
speech, whether commercial or personal. Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 393 (citing Brief for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 23 (“Justice Thomas repeatedly has called for abandonment of 
intermediate scrutiny ‘[i]n cases such as this, in which the government’s asserted interest 
is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices 
in the marketplace.’ Publishers agree with this reasoning . . . .”) (citations omitted))). 
57 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663. It’s not clearly established whether either content-based or 
speaker-based statutory language triggers “heightened judicial scrutiny,” or whether both 
are necessary. 
58 Id. at 2664. 
59 Samp, supra note 55, at 133; Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–64. 
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support his contention that content and speaker-based governmen-
tal regulation deserves a stricter scrutiny analysis, even in a purely 
commercial speech context.61 Yet almost none of these cases in-
volved public health regulation of commercial speech, and in none 
of those decisions did the Court “suggest that its call for heigh-
tened scrutiny extended to commercial speech cases.”62 In fact, the 
only commercial speech case that considered a regulation’s content 
neutrality, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,63 did not, contrary 
to Kennedy’s assertion, apply his so-called “heightened scrutiny” 
standard. It applied Central Hudson, and Justice Stevens’ opinion 
explicitly rejected having to decide whether a more exacting scruti-
ny should be applied to content or speaker-based regulations.64 In 
Sorrell, Justice Kennedy may well have decided for us.65 
Yet even after strongly implying that a public health regula-
tion’s content and speaker-based discrimination were enough to 
                                                                                                                            
60 E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (striking 
down a section of federal statute prohibiting cable stations from providing sexually 
explicit programming except during late-night hours); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622 (1994) (upholding federal “must-carry” statute requiring cable service 
operators to carry the signals of over-the-air television stations); Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Member of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (striking down New 
York’s “Son of Sam” laws prohibiting convicted criminals from profiting off of books 
published about their crimes). 
61 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–66. 
62 Samp, supra note 55, at 134 (“In noncommercial speech cases, the issue of 
‘heightened’ scrutiny usually arises in the context of determining whether time-place-or-
manner doctrine applies to a challenged speech restriction.”); Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 
391 (“[T]he majority departed from precedent establishing the commercial speech 
doctrine and confusingly infused core speech cases within its proposed commercial 
speech analysis.”). 
63 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking down Cincinnati’s ban on the distribution of a 
particular magazine from newsracks located on public property). 
64 Id. at 416 n.11 (“Because we conclude that Cincinnati’s ban on commercial 
newsracks cannot withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson and Fox, we need not decide 
whether that policy should be subjected to more exacting review.”). 
65 See Samp, supra note 55, at 135 (“Sorrell’s assertion that ‘heightened’ scrutiny 
applies to any content-based burdens imposed on speech, even when the speech is 
commercial in nature, suggests that the Court may be contemplating a substantial 
expansion of First Amendment protection for commercial speech.”); see also Sorrell, 131 
S. Ct. at 2667 (“In the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that law is 
content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul in 
supporting the contention that “content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” 
505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992)). 
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presumptively invalidate the law, Justice Kennedy proceeded to 
evaluate Act 80 under Central Hudson anyway.66 First, because the 
regulation targeted truthful speech with respect to a legal activity 
(“detailing”), the first Central Hudson prong was not relevant.67 
The Court thus evaluated whether Vermont “directly advance[d] a 
substantial governmental interest and that the measure [was] 
drawn to achieve that interest.”68 Vermont’s purported interests in 
the Act were twofold: first, it was necessary to protect a physi-
cian’s reasonable expectation of privacy, including his or her confi-
dentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-
patient relationship.69 Second, the Act was said to be integral for 
public policy objectives, particularly to improve overall public 
health and lower healthcare costs.70 
The Court was not persuaded, holding that neither reason, 
even if substantial, was sufficient to survive the intermediate tier 
standard.71 In addressing the State’s privacy argument, the Court 
held that the Act’s broad exemptions (i.e., for “educational com-
munications”) permitted widespread distribution of PII, thus un-
dermining (and not “directly advancing”) the State’s interest in 
protecting physician confidentiality.72 While Kennedy suggested 
                                                                                                                            
66 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (arguing that the outcome would be the same “whether a 
special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny applied”); see also 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 
(1999)). Yet, again, nowhere in the Greater New Orleans case—which struck down a 
regulation banning advertising of legal gambling—did the Court condone a “stricter form 
of judicial scrutiny” than Central Hudson. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184 (“In 
this case, there is no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as applied in our more 
recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision.”). Nor did the 
Court equate a more stringent “heightened scrutiny” standard with the Central Hudson 
test, as Kennedy blankly states. See id. Still, Kennedy’s formulation raises the obvious 
question: if the outcome is the same regardless of the standard applied, then why 
introduce a brand new standard into the commercial speech doctrine at all? 
67 See Samp, supra note 55, at 132. 
68 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667–68 (citations omitted). 
69 Id. at 2668. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 Id. (“The explicit structure of the statute allows the information to be studied and 
used by all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers. Given the information’s widespread 
availability and many permissible uses, the State’s asserted interest in physician 
confidentiality does not justify the burden that § 4631(d) places on protected 
expression.”) 
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the possibility that data-mining presented “serious and unresolved 
issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to 
secure,”73 Vermont still could not engage in “content-based dis-
crimination to advance its own side of a debate.”74 And while the 
first rationale (privacy) failed the third Central Hudson prong, the 
second rationale (public health) failed the fourth. The Court held 
that even if Vermont’s interests in improving public health and re-
ducing health costs were substantial, Act 80 did not advance those 
interests “in a permissible way.”75 Justice Kennedy held that a 
state may never justify regulating truthful commercial speech based 
on a fear of how people may react to the speech.76 In other words, 
Vermont may not regulate truthful speech by detailers out of fear 
that successful marketing of that speech would lead physicians and 
consumers to purchase their products. This was especially true, 
Kennedy stressed, when the targets of the marketing, physicians, 
were “sophisticated and experienced consumers.”77 The majority 
concluded that although some restrictions on commercial speech 
or conduct are permissible under the First Amendment, when a 
statute imposes “more than an incidental burden on protected ex-
pression” and does so based on the content of the speech or identi-
ty of the speaker, it will be subject to “heightened scrutiny.”78 So 
without explicitly abandoning the Central Hudson approach, the 
Court has adopted an additional standard of analysis for laws bur-
dening commercial speech. This additional “judicial scrutiny” 
standard does not attach an evaluative level of scrutiny, which, as 
seen later on in this section, will drive lower courts to fall back on 
Central Hudson as the dispositive test. 
                                                                                                                            
73 Id. at 2672. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 2670. 
76 Id. at 2670-71 (“The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of 
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be 
their own good . . . . The State can express its views through its own speech . . . But a 
State’s failure to persuade does not allow it to hamstring its opposition. The State may 
not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.” 
(citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)). 
77 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671. 
78 Id. at 2664; see also Samp, supra note 55, at 139. 
2015] THE CENTRAL HUDSON ZOMBIE 575 
 
B. Breyer’s Dissent: Creeping Toward Lochner 
In a searing dissent, Justice Breyer stressed that the problem 
was not about a burden on corporate speech, but rather commercial 
conduct.79 He argued that the Court, in deference to legislative 
judgment, has traditionally applied a very lenient standard to regu-
lating ordinary commercial transactions80 indirectly affecting 
speech.81 In doing so, he warned the Court about wading into Loch-
ner82 waters (though using the First Amendment instead of the 
Fourteenth) to evade a rational basis standard when evaluating 
“ordinary economic regulatory programs.”83 Furthermore, al-
                                                                                                                            
79 Indeed, as various commentators have pointed out, the sale of prescription patterns 
and practices by physicians does not automatically make one think of a speech issue. See 
Rauer, supra note 11, at 709 (citing Brief For New England Journal of Medicine et al. as 
Amici Curae Supporting Petitioners (arguing that selling private health information is not 
about speech, but privacy and confidentiality)). 
80 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (“[R]egulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced 
unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it 
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”); 
see also id. at n.4 (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.”). 
81 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘Our function’ in such cases, 
Justice Brandeis said, ‘is only to determine the reasonableness of the legislature’s belief in 
the existence of evils and in the effectiveness of the remedy provided.’” (quoting New 
States Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 286–87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
82 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905). Lochner v. New York was a 
landmark case in which the Court struck down a New York statute maximizing the 
number of hours worked by bakers because the statute violated a “freedom to contract” 
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The ruling was 
seen by many as the highlight of an era in which state laws regulating ordinary commercial 
conduct were struck down as unconstitutional, leading many to accuse the Court of 
“judicial activism.” See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the 
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 493 (1997) (attacking the decision as 
“illegitimate judicial activism”). 
83 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (“To apply a strict First Amendment standard virtually 
as a matter of course when a court reviews ordinary economic regulatory programs (even 
if that program has a modest impact upon a firm’s ability to shape a commercial message) 
would work at cross-purposes with this more basic constitutional approach.”). Breyer 
also cited Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Central Hudson, predicting that judges would use 
the standard to effectuate a “return to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, in which it 
was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a 
State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to 
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though the action at hand did implicate the regulation of corporate 
speech, Breyer stressed that while commercial speech has an “in-
formational function” and is not “valueless” in the marketplace of 
ideas,84 it is still afforded much less judicial scrutiny than “higher-
value” social and political speech at the core of First Amendment 
protection. 
C. The Glickman Analysis 
Throughout his dissent Breyer made repeated references to 
another commercial speech case, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & El-
liot, Inc.,85 which he felt was more similar to the case at hand. In 
Glickman, a group of fruit growers challenged regulations by the 
Department of Agriculture requiring them to collectively pay for 
the advertising and marketing of their products.86 The issue in the 
case was the standard of review afforded to the regulations. The 
Ninth Circuit, in striking down the requirements, applied the tradi-
tional intermediate-tier standard (Central Hudson) because it be-
lieved that the regulation infringed on the growers’ First Amend-
ment right to market their own products.87 The rule was struck 
down on Central Hudson’s fourth prong, holding that the govern-
ment failed to prove that collective advertising was a better alterna-
tive to the government’s purported interest behind the regula-
tion—increasing consumer demand in tree fruits—than allowing 
the growers to market their products themselves.88 The Supreme 
Court, with Justice Kennedy in the majority, overruled the Ninth 
Circuit on a 5–4 vote, holding that not only does the regulation not 
violate the First Amendment, but that it was a mistake to apply 
Central Hudson altogether, opting instead for the low-tier rational-
basis test afforded to ordinary economic regulation.89 
                                                                                                                            
implement its considered policies.” Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
84 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
563; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)). 
85 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
86 Id. at 460. 
87 Id. at 457. 
88 Id. at 458. 
89 Id. 
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The Glickman Court held that three characteristics of the ge-
neric advertising scheme distinguished it from laws the Court had 
found to abridge free speech. First, the marketing orders imposed 
no restraint on the respondents’ freedom to communicate any 
message to any audience. Second, they did not compel anyone to 
engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they did not com-
pel anyone to endorse or finance any political or ideological 
views.90 Would Sorrell have turned the other way had Glickman 
analysis been applied? Breyer suggests Glickman (and thus, a ra-
tional-basis test) should have applied here,91 and that neither Cen-
tral Hudson nor “heightened scrutiny” analyses were appropriate92 
because § 4631(d) was part of Vermont’s “traditional, comprehen-
sive regulatory regime.”93 Further, Breyer pointed out that because 
PII in itself was the result of Vermont’s requirement for pharmacies 
to maintain a “patient record system” (and thus a state-created 
right), the state should have logically been able to “create tailored 
restrictions” on its use.94 
Yet it is not clear (or at least not as clear as Breyer may have 
conveyed) that the Act could have even passed the three Glickman 
prongs in the first place. With respect to the first prong, Act 80 
does seem to restrain (at least somewhat) the respondents’ free-
dom to communicate with their target audience.95 Nonetheless, it 
is true, as Breyer points out, that the Act only bans them from sell-
ing and using PII without the physician’s consent, and not entirely.96 
Further, the pharmaceutical companies themselves do not need PII 
to market their drugs, so Act 80 does not “impose a restraint,” or 
at least an insurmountable restraint, on their freedom to communi-
                                                                                                                            
90 Id. 
91 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2563, 2676 (2011) (applying Glickman’s three 
factors to the facts at hand, “Vermont’s state neither forbids nor requires anyone to say 
anything, to engage in any form of symbolic speech, or to endorse any particular point of 
view, whether ideological or related to the sale of a product.”). 
92 Even though he ended up applying Central Hudson nonetheless. See id. at 2679–80; 
see also infra note 97 (summarizing Breyer’s Central Hudson analysis). 
93 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2676. 
94 Id. As an example, he cites a federal statute (15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)) prohibiting car 
dealerships from using existing customers’ credit scores to search for new customers. 
95 The respondents could even argue that the Act would deprive them of reaching their 
target audience at all. 
96 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (d) (West 2010). 
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cate their message to their audience. Second, the Act does not 
compel the respondents to do engage in actual or symbolic 
speech—rather, the statute is purely a restrictive measure. Howev-
er, the third prong may also be problematic because the Act does 
seem to favor non-for-profit “counter-detailers” using PII to 
spread the word about generic drugs, over for-profit corporations. 
Thus, by taking away the respondents’ right to use PII, respon-
dents could argue that their lost profits will fund the State’s ideo-
logical and political interests behind the regulation. 
Nonetheless, even assuming the corporations’ First Amend-
ment rights were implicated (i.e., they passed Glickman and were 
thus entitled to more than rational tier review), the ultimate irony 
was that Breyer, like Kennedy, applied Central Hudson anyway.97 In 
fact, while both Breyer and Kennedy’s opinions suggested aver-
sions to Central Hudson, they nonetheless applied the test instead 
of abandoning it. 
Still, Breyer’s reaction to Kennedy’s introduction of “content 
and speaker-based” analysis bordered on contemptuous. “Until 
today,” Breyer stressed, “this Court has never found that the First 
Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of 
information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate . . . . Nor 
has this Court ever previously applied any form of ‘heightened 
scrutiny’ in any even roughly similar case.”98 The absence of such 
precedent within the context of commercial speech regulation, 
                                                                                                                            
97 Breyer found the State’s interest in protecting Vermonters’ public health and the 
privacy of its physicians to be important. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2681. He then argued 
that the Act “directly advanced” each of these interests by discouraging direct marketing 
techniques, which did nothing but encourage a particular doctor to buy a certain drug 
without comparing the drug to more beneficial and cost-effective generic drugs. Id. at 
2682. He also cited expert testimony suggesting that drug companies manipulated data 
mining to “cover up information that is not in the best of light of their drug and to 
highlight information that makes them look good.” Id. With respect to a narrow tailoring, 
Breyer argues that the entire statute is in effect an “opt-in” provision—meaning, there is 
no burden on speech whatsoever so long as a doctor consents to having his name being a 
part of a PII list. Id. So in effect it is already narrowly tailored. Breyer further rejects the 
respondents’ contention that simply informing physicians that their information could be 
used for marketing purposes would be a less restrictive alternative by stressing that this 
would not achieve Vermont’s interests in creating a “fair balance” of information in 
pharmaceutical marketing sought by Vermont. Id. at 2684. 
98 Id. at 2677. 
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Breyer argued, is understandable: “regulatory programs necessarily 
draw distinctions on the basis of content.”99 The dissent argued 
that any standard evaluating such regulations on a “heightened 
scrutiny” basis was “danger[ous],” threatening to unravel “widely 
accepted regulatory activity.”100 It further criticized Kennedy’s 
umbrage with the Act “targeting” pharmacies and pharmaceutical 
companies as somehow violating the First Amendment.101 To 
Breyer, the “targeting” of a particular industry was, first and fore-
most, a legislative act that was owed legislative deference.102 To 
subject such “targeting” in the name of public health to a level of 
“heightened scrutiny” would bestow upon courts a power unseen 
since “a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for 
its interference with economic liberty.”103 By the end of his dis-
sent, Breyer flatly accuses the majority of resurrecting Lochner-era 
substantive due process jurisprudence: 
                                                                                                                            
99 Id. (emphasis added) (“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First 
Amendment protection, . . . it must be distinguished by its content.” (citing Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976))). For 
example, Breyer cites “electricity regulators” who regulate “company statements, 
pronouncements, and proposals, but only about electricity. The Federal Reserve Board 
that regulates the content of statements, advertising, loan proposals, and interest rate 
disclosures, but only when made by financial institutions. And the FDA oversees the form 
and content of labeling, advertising, and sales proposals of drugs, but not of furniture.” 
Sorrel, 131 S. Ct at 2677. 
100 Sorrel, 131 S. Ct. at 2676–77 (“The ease with which one can point to actual or 
hypothetical examples with potentially adverse speech-related effects at least roughly 
comparable to those at issue here indicates the danger of applying a ‘heightened’ or 
‘intermediate’ standard of First Amendment review where typical regulatory actions 
affect commercial speech (say, by withholding information that a commercial speaker 
might use to shape the content of a message).”). 
101 Id. (“Nothing in Vermont’s statute undermines the ability of persons opposing the 
State’s policies to . . . .pursue a different set of policy objectives through the democratic 
process. Whether Vermont’s regulatory state “targets” drug companies (as opposed to 
affecting them unintentionally) must be beside the First Amendment point.”). 
102 Id. (“The related statutes, regulations, programs, and initiatives almost always 
reflect a point of view, for example, of the Congress and the administration that enacted 
them and ultimately the voters. And they often aim at, and target, particular firms that 
engage in practices about the merits of which the Government and the firms may 
disagree.” (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 75-225, at 4 (1937), request from President Franklin 
Roosevelt for legislation to ease the plight of factory workers)). 
103 Id. (“History shows that the power was much abused and resulted in the 
constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists.”). 
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At best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of First 
Amendment challenges to many ordinary  regula-
tory practices that only incidentally affect a com-
mercial message . . . At worst, it reawakens Loch-
ner’s pre-New deal threat of substituting judicial for 
democratic decisionmaking where  ordinary eco-
nomic regulation is at issue.104 
D. How Have Public Health Regulations Actually Fared Under 
Sorrell? 
So far, there seems to be a consensus among lower courts that 
Sorrell did not impose a strict scrutiny standard, insofar as the 
Court was not clear in establishing whether “heightened judicial 
scrutiny” made a content or speaker-based commercial speech 
regulation presumptively invalid.105 The Fourth Circuit, in striking 
down a regulation banning advertisements of alcohol in college 
newspapers, read Sorrell to establish a tiered approach: only if the 
regulation passes Central Hudson will it need to be tested for con-
tent and speaker discrimination under “heightened judicial scruti-
ny,” and the reason the latter standard was not tested in Sorrell is 
because Vermont failed Central Hudson.106 The Ninth Circuit fol-
                                                                                                                            
104 Id. at 2685. 
105 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1226 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (“Notwithstanding any intimations it may have made in cases such as Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court has continued to apply the more deferential 
framework of Central Hudson to commercial speech restrictions.” (citations omitted)); 
N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development v. Crest Ultrasonics, 82 A.3d 258, 268 
(N.J. App. Div. 2014) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to, and upholding, fine for 
violation of statute prohibiting employer from publishing an advertisement stating that a 
job applicant must be currently employed in order for application to be considered); King 
v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (affirming 
intermediate scrutiny analysis under Sorrell) (“By the Court declaring that ‘the outcome 
is the same’ whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial 
scrutiny (strict scrutiny) is applied, GIS asserts that Sorrell marks a substantial shift in the 
protection afforded to commercial speech and, consequently, overhauls the well-
embedded Central Hudson test. This Court disagrees.”). 
106 See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(“The College Newspapers . . . argue that, like the regulation at issue in Sorrell, the 
challenged regulation here involves both content-based and speaker-based discrimination. 
Based on this alleged discrimination, the College Newspapers argue that strict scrutiny 
applies. However, like the Court in Sorrell, we need not determine whether strict scrutiny 
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lowed suit, striking down under Central Hudson’s fourth prong a 
statutory provision prohibiting day laborers from soliciting em-
ployment in the streets for public safety reasons.107 The Second 
Circuit held, in striking down FDA regulations prohibiting truthful 
off-label promotion of pharmaceuticals, that content and speaker-
based regulations were presumptively invalid under Sorrell, but that 
the regulation needed to be evaluated under Central Hudson re-
gardless.108 Judge Chin hinted that Central Hudson was not a thre-
shold to the “heightened judicial scrutiny” standard, but just the 
opposite: a way for the government to overcome the presumptive 
invalidity of a content-or speaker-based regulation.109 Almost none 
of the post-Sorrell challenges to public health regulations have both 
passed Central Hudson and failed “heightened judicial scrutiny,” 
or vice versa. In fact, in consonance with the Court’s already strin-
gent (some say hostile) 110 evaluation of governmental infringement 
on commercial speech, circuit courts interpreting Sorrell have 
mostly struck down the challenged regulation under Central Hud-
son regardless.111 The one exception recently came from the Eighth 
Circuit, which, amidst a rather complicated set of facts,112 upheld a 
Minnesota statute restricting advertising that targets car accident 
victims. The Otto court held that while various parts of the statute 
applied both speaker-and-content-based restrictions on commercial 
                                                                                                                            
is applicable here, given that, as detailed below, we too hold that the challenged regulation 
fails under intermediate scrutiny set forth Central Hudson.”). 
107 Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Whether Sorrell 
intended to make the commercial speech test more exacting for the state to meet is a 
question that we need not decide, because we conclude plaintiffs are likely to succeed 
even under Central Hudson’s formulation of the standard and our cases interpreting it.”). 
108 See generally United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
109 See id. (“To determine whether a government regulation unconstitutionally restricts 
speech, courts engage in a two–step inquiry, first considering whether the regulation 
restricting speech was content- and speaker-based, so that it is subject to heightened 
scrutiny and is presumptively invalid, and then considering whether the government has 
shown that the restriction on speech was consistent with the First Amendment under the 
applicable level of heightened scrutiny.”). 
110 See Pomeranz, supra note 2. 
111 See, e.g., supra notes 105–08. 
112 See 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(upholding a Minnesota statute mandating that advertising for medical treatment eligible 
for coverage under the state’s no-fault auto insurance statute be undertaken only by, or at 
the direction of, a healthcare provider). 
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speech, the ads in question were misleading.113 Because Central 
Hudson explicitly denies constitutional protection for speech that 
concerns unlawful activity or is “inherently misleading,” the sta-
tute was upheld.114 
III. THE AFTERMATH: WHAT DOES SORRELL MEAN FOR 
FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION? 
 
Is Sorrell a narrow decision chiding a liberal Vermont legisla-
ture gone awry, or a de facto establishment of a strict scrutiny stan-
dard for commercial speech regulation? The controversy may lie 
within the liberal–conservative disconnect behind the actual defini-
tion of “commercial speech.” Justice Breyer sees the Court using 
the precept of “commercial speech” as a potential end-run around 
Carolene Products and its progeny115—a laissez-faire Court striking 
down perfectly reasonable regulation of ordinary transactions.116 
Justice Kennedy disagrees, pointing to the Vermont legislature’s 
                                                                                                                            
113 See id. at 1055–58. One of the plaintiffs’ advertisements promised a possible 
entitlement of “up to $40,000 in injury and lost wage benefits,” which the court found 
inherently misleading to consumers because it implied that consumers would receive a 
“floor” of benefits, potentially up to $40,000, when many could in fact receive nothing. 
Id. (citing 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Tollefson, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1051-52 
(D. Minn. 2012)). Other advertising (hiring paid actors to appear as cops) also implied an 
endorsement of 411-Pain by law enforcement, which was also inherently misleading, even 
though there was a disclaimer in the advertisement that the “cop” was a paid actor. 
114 “Inherently misleading” speech is speech that “inevitably will be misleading” to 
consumers. See Otto, 744 F.3d. at 1056 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
372 (1977)). 
115 See supra text accompanying note 80. The “end” run is merely using one 
amendment (the First) instead of another (the Fourteenth) to achieve the same result, 
which is to strike down the regulation of ordinary commercial transactions on a stricter 
level of review (“intermediate” or “strict” instead of “rational”) than is warranted. 
116 Cf. Erin E. Bennett, Central Hudson Plus: Why Off-Label Pharmaceutical Speech Will 
Find Its Voice, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 459, 460 (2012) (“[D]oes speech that would be fully 
protected as scientific and/or educational speech become transformed into commercial 
speech, with its reduced level of protection, by the mere fact that a commercial entity 
seeks to distribute it in order to increase its sales of the product addressed in the 
speech?”). This question gets at the heart of why Breyer and Kennedy see the question at 
hand so differently: in Breyer’s mind, this is a perfectly reasonable regulation of an 
economic transaction. To Kennedy, this is the government preventing a company from 
educating physicians simply because they don’t like the outcome. 
2015] THE CENTRAL HUDSON ZOMBIE 583 
 
explicit purpose behind the Act,117 which was to interfere with the 
manufacturers’ marketing efforts.118 How, Kennedy wonders, is 
Act 80’s complete ban on drug manufacturers’ ability to effectively 
advertise “incidental” to the infringement of commercial 
speech?119 Richard Samp is not impressed by Breyer’s reaction to 
Vermont’s pharmaceutical “targeting” as simply being “beside 
the First Amendment point.”120 Further, Breyer’s urging of Glick-
man-type rational basis analysis seemed to repudiate Central Hud-
son and its progeny altogether, perhaps harking back for the doc-
trine of Chrestensen, when commercial speech essentially equaled 
non-speech.121 Yet Samp seemed dissatisfied with the majority opi-
nion as well, noting that its application of both “heightened judicial 
scrutiny” and Central Hudson left open challenges to public health 
regulation without a clear standard of analysis.122 
How will Sorrell affect future regulation of commercial speech? 
For one, until the Court considers a similar regulation, there is 
bound to be a bifurcation of analyses in the lower courts, first ana-
lyzing whether a regulation is content- or speaker-based, and then 
whether that regulation passes Central Hudson (or vice versa).123 It 
                                                                                                                            
117 A possible analogy could be made to the upcoming battle over gay marriage rights. 
See Adam Liptak, Opinion May Pose Obstacle for Same Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/us/politics/ruling-poses-potential-obstacle-
at-supreme-court-for-same-sex-marriage.html. As Liptak stresses, Justice Kennedy 
seemed to be swayed in the Windsor decision by evidence of Congress’s animus towards 
homosexuality in its passing of the Defense of Marriage Act. Id. A similarly 
discriminatory purpose could have offended Kennedy in Act 80. 
118 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (reciting the legislative 
history behind Act 80). 
119 Id. at 2680 (“The statute threatens only modest harm to commercial speech.”). 
120 Samp, supra note 55, at 147 (noting that this assertion was made without support or 
citation to case law). 
121 Id. (“It is difficult to see how any of the Court’s commercial speech decisions could 
have been decided in favor of those challenging government speech regulations if the 
Court had applied Justice Breyer’s relaxed standard of review.”) Samp adds that because 
Breyer and Ginsburg had dissented in major commercial speech cases like Thompson and 
Lolliard, their distaste for the majority’s opinion and Central Hudson itself is not 
surprising. Id. at 148. 
122 Id. 
123 See, e.g., Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(testing Central Hudson without even applying or testing content or speaker basis); 
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down an FDA regulation 
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is not entirely clear from Kennedy’s opinion whether a public 
health regulation is presumptively invalidated once shown to be 
speaker- and content-based, or even whether the “heightened” 
standard is harsher or more intense than Central Hudson. Both 
Kennedy and Breyer seem to think that this is the case, but Kenne-
dy mentions that the outcome in Sorrell would have been the same 
under either standard.124 Similar outcomes don’t necessarily imply 
that the tests are similar in their evaluative rigor. Still, Kennedy’s 
application of Central Hudson may have been a signal to lower 
courts that a content or speaker-based commercial speech regula-
tion was not presumptively invalid under the new heightened scru-
tiny standard. Though, judging by the application (or lack thereof) 
of Sorrell by the circuit courts, this interpretation seems unlikely. 
Lyle Denniston, reading the ruling narrowly,125 believes that the 
acrimony of Breyer’s dissent is unwarranted due to Kennedy’s 
suggestion that had Vermont just been “less aggressive (and less 
candid) in declaring its commitment to reducing the sales of phar-
maceutical companies,” the law may have survived.126 
Others, however, believe Sorrell could have far-reaching conse-
quences.127 Professor Tamara Piety contemptuously compares the 
                                                                                                                            
prohibiting truthful promotion of off-label drug use as both content and speaker-based, 
then under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson). 
124 See supra note 66. 
125 Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Like Ships Passing in the Night . . . , SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 23, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-like-
ships-passing-in-the-night/ (“If the soaring language is put aside, what might be 
concluded about what emerged on Thursday is, basically, a decision that Vermont simply 
botched the job of promoting the availability of cheaper, generic drugs by over-
reaching.”). 
126 Id. 
127 See, e.g., Piety, supra note 36, at 4, 50 (“What is most at risk is the government’s 
ability to regulate fraud because the strict scrutiny standard of review is often said to be 
strict in theory and fatal in fact.”) (internal quotations omitted); Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 856 
(2011) (arguing that this decision may bring about troubling implications for state 
enforcement of privacy); Andrew J. Wolf, Detailing Commercial Speech: What 
Pharmaceutical Marketing Reveals About Bans on Commercial Speech, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1291, 1291 (2013) (“Sorrell pushes the commercial speech doctrine ever closer to 
that used to analyze noncommercial speech.”). Another possible legislative solution 
would have been for Vermont to simply close the “loophole” excepting “counter-
detailers” from having an unfair advantage in using PII. This fix could have neutralized 
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majority opinion in Sorrell to Citizens United,128 where the Court 
used similar “anti discrimination rhetoric”129 in striking down pub-
lic welfare regulation detrimental to large corporations.130 Jennifer 
Pomeranz points out that the last commercial speech case in which 
the Court ruled for the government, Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,131 
may not be upheld under Sorrell because the statute at issue, bar-
ring attorneys from advertising to accident victims within 30 days 
of the accident, is both content- and speaker-based.132 
A. Court Majority’s Business-Friendly Ideology Pushes Standard 
Towards Strict Scrutiny 
Professor Pomeranz also seems to suggests that because the 
ideological makeup of the Court today is much more business and 
corporate friendly133 than it was even a decade before Sorrell was 
handed down, Central Hudson’s fourth prong on its own might be 
enough to lift the commercial speech doctrine to a strict scrutiny 
standard.134 She may be onto something,135 for when it comes to 
                                                                                                                            
the contention that the State preferred its policy objectives over First Amendment 
concerns. 
128 Citizens United v. Fed. Elction Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
129 See Piety, supra note 36, at 4 (“[T]reating global pharmaceutical companies as if they 
were embattled, under-represented minorities risks trivializing the real life-and-death 
struggles of plaintiffs who are in fact relatively powerless and elides the Court’s exercise 
of its counter-majoritarian power on behalf of the powerful.”). 
130 Id. (arguing that the Court views corporations as “legitimate rights holders” and 
participants in the political process, and that Citizens United influenced the Court’s 
interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine “in a way that turned that doctrine on 
its head”). 
131 515 U.S. 618 (1995). Not surprisingly, Breyer was in the majority in upholding the 
regulation, while Kennedy wrote the dissent. 
132 Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 423–24. 
133 See Liptak, supra note 10. 
134 Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 431–32 (discussing the holding of Massachusetts’ anti-
tobacco regulations in Lorilland, Pomeranz says: “One has to wonder if a five-hundred-
foot radius would have sufficed in 2001, or if one hundred feet would have passed in 
2011.”); see also Post, supra note 27, on Central Hudson’s fourth prong: (“This last 
requirement is so arbitrary that it constitutes an open invitation for judges to bring 
political prejudices to bear in resolving cases. Antiregulatory judges will tend to strike 
down statutes on the basis of this requirement; proregulatory judges will tend to uphold 
them.”). 
135 See generally, Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree 
With’, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/in-
justices-votes-free-speech-often-means-speech-i-agree-with.html (“[T]he votes of both 
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First Amendment jurisprudence, jurists of liberal and conservative 
ideologies tend to encompass entirely separate universes. It is in 
fact not uncommon for a liberal and conservative judge to look at 
the same set of facts, yet apply completely opposite legal standards 
to evaluate those facts.136 This ideological divide persists when the 
Court evaluates public health regulation of commercial speech, and 
Sorrell nicely exemplifies this divide. Justice Kennedy, pointing to 
Vermont’s preference for nonprofit organizations using the very 
marketing techniques it prohibits for-profit corporations from us-
ing, believes that the law is a clear violation of these companies’ 
commercial speech rights. On the other hand, Justice Breyer is 
convinced that the case is not about “speech” at all, but a run-of-
the-mill privacy and public health regulation restricting large cor-
porations from sharing allegedly unauthorized, private data. How is 
it that two veteran judges can evaluate the same statute, with one 
claiming that it’s a blatant First Amendment violation, and the 
other asserting that it barely concerns the First Amendment at all? 
Somewhat paradoxically, it seems that both Kennedy and Brey-
er intensely dislike Central Hudson, and, like Robert Post,137 believe 
the test is unwieldy and subject to the whims of individual judges. 
In his heart, Kennedy probably wants to get rid of Central Hudson 
(which has been a strict scrutiny standard all but in name only) and 
elevate commercial speech to the high tier, but he didn’t know how 
to do it without overturning an entire doctrine of law. Breyer also 
probably wants to get rid of Central Hudson, and instead instill 
                                                                                                                            
liberal and conservative justices tend to reflect their preferences toward the ideological 
groupings of the speaker.”). 
136 See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(granting motion for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds to defendant 
magazine for publishing an article titled “Orgasm of Death” on autoerotic asphyxiation 
which inspired a child to unintentionally commit suicide). The dissenter, conservative 
Edith Hollis Jones, believed this article to constitute “pornography,” and thus owed a 
much lesser standard of constitutional protection. Id. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down ordinance banning, among other things, burning 
crosses). Here, the liberal justices believed that the ordinance was over-inclusive because 
it seemed to ban abstract speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Scalia and 
some of the conservatives, however, believed the ordinance to be under-inclusive for 
failing to protect against certain type of speech (anti-conservative speech). The 
conservatives thus deemed the fighting words statute at issue not content-neutral. See id. 
137 See supra notes 27, 36. 
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Glickman or perhaps even Chrestensen. This would also be a radical 
change from a lot of established precedent. Regardless, until the 
Court clarifies the exact weight behind “heightened judicial scruti-
ny,” the standard of review will continue to be, for better or worse, 
Central Hudson. 
CONCLUSION 
First Amendment challenges to the regulation of business ad-
vertising have been adjudicated for many decades. The debate has 
not, notably, fallen on predictably ideological lines, with conserva-
tives urging full protection for corporate or business speech and 
liberals protecting government regulation thereof.138 This dynamic 
has only been a relatively recent phenomenon, when the Court be-
gan to take an increasingly hostile view of such regulation.139 As 
stressed earlier, the Court has not upheld a regulation of business 
advertising for almost two decades.140 The Court’s suspicion of 
governmental regulation of commercial speech could very well be 
attributed to a more business-friendly ideology shared by a majority 
of the Justices.141 
Yet the Sorrell Court was nonetheless not ready to give com-
mercial speech the same level of protection given to personal 
speech. This Note does not address the wisdom of such a trans-
formation, but merely to stress that if the court wishes to depart 
from Central Hudson, it should say so explicitly. Assigning no value 
to a new standard of analysis can confuse the lower courts, turning 
lower court judges into amateur prognosticators of what an ambi-
guous standard meant, instead of letting them to apply clear stan-
dards of law to the facts at hand. 
Until the Court speaks more clearly, it would probably be best 
for courts to continue to judge commercial speech challenges 
against the traditional Central Hudson model, while taking into ac-
count the heightened scrutiny analysis outlined in Sorrell. A regula-
tion’s speaker or content-based discrimination should not in itself 
                                                                                                                            
138 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra note 36. 
140 See supra note 26. 
141 See supra notes 10, 135. 
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invalidate the law under Sorrell, because the Sorrell court probably 
would not have even bothered going through the Central Hudson 
factors if the analysis ended at the speaker and content discrimina-
tion inquiry. 
In the end, the status quo satisfies neither those advocating for 
the expansion of commercial speech rights nor those who wish to 
sensibly regulate them. With an intermediate standard of analysis, 
however, the Court’s skeptical viewpoint towards commercial 
speech regulation could easily shift along with the Court’s ideolog-
ical makeup. This could potentially make it tempting for the cur-
rent Court’s majority to consider scrapping Central Hudson, but 
there has been no sign that the Court is actually willing to do so. 
